20c • AUGUST 10, 1953

New York-Battle of the Bosses

New Republic



Emergencies for Eisenhower

In the GOP—Ike Without Taft

In Europe—Pro-US Parties Crumble

In Asia—The UN Asserts Its Rights

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T. R. B. *Washington Wire*

We've seen a number of Presidents in our time. Bless them, we've liked 'em all—stuck as they are with an impossible job! Harding was handsomest and weakest, Roosevelt greatest, Coolidge the comic nonentity. Then there was poor, shy Hoover who tried so earnestly and never knew what it was all about, and Truman, who, we suspect, will rank rather well in the eyes of history.

So now we come to Eisenhower, elected as National Hero without any prior political experience at all. Like Hoover he never held elected office before—but Hoover at least served eight years in the cabinet. Nothing like Ike's election had happened in America since 1868 with Grant. Ike came to office with wide practice in handling men and a broad global concept, but he had never faced a hostile press conference nor brought his boyhood Abilene concept of American society up to date.

How one should have expected anything but a spotty first year in office with this background we dont know. The sympathetic press has done a good job covering up for the laboring President, and he has had a second big advantage — particularly in foreign affairs— a responsible opposition, something Truman and Acheson never had. Yet the thing that stands out in this first period is Ike's political inexperience.

To protect himself Ike has shied away from press conferences: instead of a two-a-week schedule like Roosevelt's, Ike has had about one a fortnight; there have been only 14 in his first 27 weeks in office. At the latest (July 22), he told a reporter that he had never supposed his proposal to give Republicans an extra man on the Tariff Commission would cause political objection. With disarming candor he explained that he had been told there were stalemates in the six-man Commission (a bi-partisan body with equal party representation) and to speed things up he had agreed to add an extra Republican. Why, he would have been prepared to reduce the number by one to achieve the same goal! What could be more accommodating than that? Wondering reporters glanced at each other. The encouraging thing is that Ike realizes, however dimly, that something is wrong. He told the press that maybe he had not looked into this tariff matter as deeply as he should. Ike was again realizing that he had been given bad advice.

Latest instance of bad advice is the selection of Gov. James Byrnes as a member of the US delegation to the UN Assembly, a man whose name is associated with racial intolerance and who, in fact, bolted the Stevenson ticket on that issue. It seems strange for a democracy to pick such a figure to deal with Soviet totalitarians.

The story of the first session of the 83rd Congress is simple. It passed a number of important laws, but it postponed until next January practically all the big policy decisions. No doubt Ike hopes that by January he will know where he stands and also perhaps what he stands for. He has six more months to find answers that will reconcile election promises with the facts. It becomes obvious at once that Congress has postponed more work than it can possibly get through in the political short term preceding an election.

In January, for example, the Administration promises a complete revision of the whole tax structure, probably including manufacturers' sales taxes. That is good for three months' debate by itself. Then there is the plan to rewrite the tariff system: somehow high-tariff Republicans must be reconciled to "trade-not-aid." There are months of debate here, too. The Administration similarly will bring in its answer to farm distress, and offer its ideas on social security extension and the Taft-Hartley Act. These are all matters on which the Administration should have known its position when it took office and should have brought in as bills one after another when its prestige was highest. Nobody can tell what will happen now.

There is a disconcerting resemblance between the freedom of Eisenhower's pledges in the election campaign and the numerous hopes and promises that Secretary Dulles seems to have distributed in the Pacific to get Korean truce. The trouble will be when these diplomatic IOUs begin to come due. Dulles has picked a strong quartet of Senators to accompany him to Korea to meet Syngman Rhee, and if they see eye-to-eye the utlimate treaty ratification will be speeded. We are aware that we are in a hopeless minority in believing that Red China eventually should join the UN. To us it seems simply a recognition of the facts of life—we don't like the Reds, but for all that, they control continental China, and as for the UN, its essence is its universatility and the idea that even the villains should be in it so they can be watched better.

Two of the most conservative men in public life, Herbert Hoover and James A. Farley, have been picked to head the so-called new "Hoover Commission" which most people assume is like the old commission, an impartial body to streamline executive agencies. Nothing of the sort: the new Hoover Commission is not bi-partisan by law; it is not limited to the mechanics of government; it is, in fact, dealing with fundamental policies. Where and how is the government interfering with private enterprise; what "non-essential" New Deal agency should be dispensed with; what fields of social legislation should the government yield to the states? The new Hoover Commission will, it can be predicted now, bring in conservative policy recommendations which, if adopted, would turn the clock back to Hoover's day.

NOTES: The embarrassed Administration brought in the bill to boost the debt limit at the last minute in the hope of rushing it through on a hit-run basis. . . . Decline in support for foreign aid was one of the most significant features of Congress and for the first time included Democrats. . . .

As Congress closed, Sen. John L. McClellan (D, Ark.) warned the Senate that he had waited the session out to see if the Republicans wanted "to do something about" curbing McCarthy's power and that he will take the lead himself in the next session to limit McCarthy's right to hire and fire staff if the GOP does not move first.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

The Un-Tory Activities Probe

THE TROUBLE with the House Un-American Activities Committee and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, according to Rep. B. Carroll Reece (R, Tenn.), is that they are "limited to subversion." They can't touch such dangerous activities as the "propagation of the so-called liberal viewpoint." That sort of investigation would require a new kind of committee with a new kind of blank check, both of which Reece demanded and got late last month.

His resolution, passed by a 209-163 vote in the House, sets him up as chairman of a committee to probe tax-free philanthropic foundations "using their resources for un-American and subversive activities; for political purposes; propaganda, or attempts to influence legislation."

If the wording of the resolution was vague, Reece himself was remarkably specific in urging its passage. He felt "alarmed," he said, at the "lopsided" support that foundations have given to liberalism in education, as contrasted with their "timid" support of "educational institutions . . . whose objectives would be classed as conservative."

"Have they given support," he demanded, "to the educational programs of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Catholic and Jewish veterans' organizations? And, if not, what is their explanation of the fact that they have been supporting agencies which are left of center and are internationalist, and not similarly favoring nationalist organizations?"

Reece felt special alarm at the Fund for the Republic, which was using "$15 million from the fortune of the late Henry Ford, who probably hated Communism more than any American of his day . . . to attack Congress for inquiring into the extent of the Communist conspiracy; on grounds that Congress was 'abridging civil liberties' . . . "

All this activity, Reece suggested, was "propaganda"—which clearly brought it within the investigative scope of the group he will head. The suspected propagandists included "such large foundations as Rockefeller, Carnegie, Ford, Sloan, and Field"; such beneficiaries as the University of Chicago, the National Educational Association, and "pro-Communist India"; and such individuals as Robert M. Hutchins, Philip C. Jessup, and Paul Hoffman.

Rep. James G. Fulton (R, Pa.), one of several articulate critics of the resolution, was troubled by its vagueness. "For example . . . the word 'propaganda.' Who is it that will determine what is propaganda, and, therefore, bad?" he demanded during the debate. "These phrases . . . are clearly so broad in scope as to make the resolution oppressive to foundations of perfectly legitimate standing, who only differ politically with the chairman of the investigating committee."

Reece, too, experienced some discomfort at the broad scope of his creation, but only because he feared inter-committee friction, a situation which, with inter-party politics in such a delicate state of balance, would be embarrassing at best and untenable at worst.

Of course, a foundation which actually put out propaganda would be violating its tax-free status and would therefore come under the investigative eye of the tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee. Reece had to assure this committee that he wasn't stepping on its toes. It was his purpose, he said, to investigate the "activities" of the foundations rather than their "tax status." On the other hand, a truly subversive foundation would be meat for the Un-American Activities Committee, so Reece made it clear that he wasn't stepping on that toe either. He explained that he intended to investigate "organizations and projects which, if not subversive in the extreme sense of that word, tend to weaken or discredit the capitalistic system as it exists in the United States. . . . "

In short, Reece was rushing in where the other committees feared to tread—a probe of liberalism. For the first time, the charter of a Congressional investigating committee explicitly makes this possible.



That's funny—my ticket is for the same seat

"American Swine"

FOR THE SECOND time in six weeks the Russian Army has had to rescue the East German "People's Government" from the wrath of its citizens. To its masters in the Kremlin, the actions of the East German government must seem like inexcusable bungling. Apparently surprised at the size of the turnout, the Communist regime allowed 1,200,000 East Germans to collect parcels of US food before cracking down. By then there could be no pretense that East Germans were not suffering. Half of the parcels went to East Berliners, the other half—600,000—went to people who trekked in from every part of the Soviet Zone.

The Communists reacted with the ferocity of a startled boar. Travel bans were clamped on highways and railroads. As workers stormed ticket offices in Lottbus and Brandenburg they were fired on by the "Peoples Police." Infantry of the "Peoples Army" clubbed workers

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trying to board Berlin-bound trains in Jena, Potsdam and Gera. Those returning from Berlin with food packages for their families were beaten. The label "American Swine" was pasted on their backs and their food confiscated. Soldiers spilled milk on railroad tracks and clubbed mothers who were bringing it home. The number of packages distributed in one day fell from 240,000 to 50,000.

But thousands of East Germans attacked infantry and police in Potsdam. At Merseburg, 85 miles from Berlin, workers at the huge Leura chemical plant called a strike and demanded the government's resignation. At Chemnitz, 110 miles south of Berlin, crowds set fire to government buildings and stores. So Russian troops and Russian tanks which had left the cities just a few weeks ago had to move in again.

Certainly these forces can crush the people. And certainly, if the Communists close the border between East and West Germany, food distribution will be effectively stopped. But we are sending enough food to Germany to feed 9 million people. And the East Germans will know it is there, waiting. The Communist terror has made it unnecessary to pretend that food distribution is a purely German program. The American radio station, RIAS, can now speak out and capitalize on what is plainly a psychological victory for the West.

As for the future, the choice for Communists seems to be harsher suppression or the abandonment of East Germany. Hatred of the East German government is now over-riding. And the constant intervention of Russian troops joins Russia to its puppet as the focus of that hatred. It is difficult to see how Russia can maintain any Communist regime, under whatever leaders, in East Germany except by force, expensive force.

Special Visas, For Whom?

BOTH HOUSES of Congress have passed a measure authorizing the admission to the US of 214,000 special immigrants during the next three and one-half years. Sen. Pat McCarran (D, Nev.), frustrated in his efforts to kill this bill in committee, inserted a few clauses which all but nullify it.

One clause requires an applicant to provide a documented history of the two years of his life immediately preceding his application. This means that a refugee from a satellite country should have stopped by the city hall and the local police station to pick up the necessary documents.

Another clause requires an applicant to prove he is assured of readmission to his own country. No refugee could meet that requirement.

Other clauses allow consular and immigration officials abroad to refuse visas for the most intangible reasons. Most of these officials have been badly intimidated by the specter of a summons to appear before a Congressional committee. If a refugee manages to satisfy all these requirements, his case is to be reviewed by equally intimidated officials in the US when he steps ashore.

This bill was to be a symbol of hope to tens of thousands sitting in refugee camps throughout Europe. Instead, it seems a symbol of the inadequacy of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act and of the "quota system" embodied in that Act. The US is constantly forced to make exceptions to the "quota system"; but because the system remains untouched, the exceptions seldom seem adequate to the need.

Mr. TVA

THE GET-KEFAUVER DRIVE in Tennessee, which a few months ago was moving forward jubilantly, is today bogged down in confusion and uncertainty. And while the state's senior Senator may yet face a tough battle for political survival, hopes of his opponents are no longer high.

Expectations of defeating Kefauver took root in Eisenhower's victory in the state, coupled with the crushing defeat of Gov. Gordon Browning. Moreover, a seemingly sure-fire candidate had appeared on the scene in the person of youthful Frank Clement, who had swept through the state against Browning with evangelistic fervor. Even before the gubernatorial race was officially decided, Clement supporters were shouting "on to the Senate!" The Clement potentialities were certainly formidable. He had the support of the trucking interests with the richest slush fund in the state, and, with time, a state-wide organization shored up with wide patronage. He could be certain of the support of the Republican press. Coal, textile, oil, and other industrial and financial interests displayed open interest.

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Three developments, however, have radically changed the picture. First, the Clement administration has made an unexpectedly large number of enemies. Second, the unpredictable Congressman, Pat Sutton, by announcing for the Senate ahead of Clement, made it certain that a third candidate will have to split the anti-Kefauver vote with him. Finally, the Republican drive against the TVA has proved a godsend to the man who is practically "Mr. TVA" in Tennessee. While his opponents covertly raged, every TVA rally has brought Kefauver to the state as the principal speaker.

Referring to one such rally, a leading figure in the state textile industry observed irritably, "The TVA is not in danger. I think this whole business . . . is a scheme to put Kefauver back in the Senate. And I'm afraid it is going to succeed."

"Sutton has ruined things," grumbled a disappointed businessman. "He did not consult us in advance. And the truth is his record is too meaningless to command the confidence of business. I guess Kefauver will be back here soon and shake hands with everybody in the state. We'll do our best to beat him, but things don't look so good right now."

How Much Public Power

THE FIRST session of the Republican 83rd Congress seemed to do little but quarrel with the Republican Administration. Yet, in one area, Congress and Administration found themselves in complete accord—public power. They accomplished a great deal. While a few of the more dramatic power "giveaways" were spot-lighted in the press, the Republicans quietly managed to all but reverse the public power policies evolved over the past 47 years.

One example is the treatment of the Interior Department appropriation. Truman requested $607,336,400. President Eisenhower reduced this to $491,119,200. The House appropriated $406,130,343, deeply slashing funds for power development. The House Appropirations Committee tried to explain that "while the reduction in the budget is greater than in the past, the orderly development and use of the Nation's resources and the full responsibility of the Federal Government for those programs which must be its sole responsibility have not been curtailed."

The Senate Committee disagreed. It restored more than 10 percent, about one-third of it for construction of power facilities, raising the total to $451,256,940. The final version passed by both Houses calls for $433,561,550, 20 percent under Truman's request. But figures give only part of the story. More ominous is the text of the House Committee report:

"The Interior Department should be concerned with only those functions or activities which private enterprise cannot or will not undertake.

" . . . Wherever possible, private enterprise shall be taken into partnership to build, own and operate that part of each project that can be handled by private ownership under conditions that protect the interest of all the people. In all future projects . . . which include transmission lines, private enterprise shall be urged to take the initiative in constructing, owning and operating such works before money is made available for Federal construction."

As an example of what it considers a desirable arrangement, the Committee picked the Hoover Dam, the same project praised a few weeks earlier by Herbert Hoover:

"The Committee believes that the Hoover (Boulder) Dam is an outstanding example of how Government and private enterprise can work hand-in-hand to mutual advantage. Here the dam, with penstocks, was built from Federal funds. The surplus power . . . was . . . leased to private utility companies and municipalities which financed and built the transmission facilities. Here the Government is receiving a reasonable return and the consumers of power are paying reasonable rates."

These statements amount to a repeal of Section 5 of the Flood Control Act, of 1944, which gives preference to public bodies and co-operatives in the sale of government power. On the basis of this policy, the House eliminated funds for transmission lines in the Southeastern and Southwestern Power Administration territories, slashed deeply into Bonneville Power Administration and Bureau of Reclamation funds. This policy leads to a denial of public power to all but those private utilities and large groups which can afford to construct their own lines to the bus-bar at the dam. It is the policy advocated by Herbert Hoover.

Similarly, Congressional action on the Army Civil Functions bill left only about two-thirds of the funds originally proposed in the Truman budget for rivers and harbors and flood control.

TVA appropriations also ran into the opponents of public power. The Eisenhower budget withheld $31 million needed to complete projects already begun by TVA, and cut out $30-million for the projected Fulton Steam plant needed by 1955 to satisfy normal power-demand growth.

As for the rural electrification program, restrictions placed on the use of funds for certain transmission lines in the Southwest Power Administration area virtually assure bankruptcy for six generating and transmitting co-operatives which had the foresight to build facilities capable of handling demand-increase over the next several decades.

The oil companies joined the power companies in rejoicing at the fate of the Interior bill: Under the revised Eisenhower budget, spokesmen for the department parrotted the National Petroleum Council to recommend cessation of experimental work at the synthetic liquid fuel plant at Louisiana, Missouri. This former ordnance plant produced gasoline from coal gasification work which the Bureau of Mines had long carried on in co-operation with the Alabama Power Company, plus some laboratories. The work at Louisiana and Rifle, Colorado, had brought the cost of liquid fuels to within shooting range of the price of petroleum-derived gasoline.

Efforts by interested Representatives on the House floor did more to restore funds for the Rifle plant than the half-hearted attempts of Department spokesmen. The trained staff of the underground and hydrogenation projects will now be dispersed. It will be difficult to reassemble them.

N. Y. Elects a Mayor

Since the article on page 15 was written, the following late developments have occurred:

Judge Samuel Leibowitz, Fusion Party candidate who was threatening to enter the Democratic primary for Mayor of New York City, has withdrawn from the race completely.

Approximately one-third of the leaders of Tammany Hall, after going along with the endorsement of Robert F. Wagner, Jr., have swung to Mayor Vincent Impellitteri.

It is now virtually certain that all parties will name Negro candidates for Borough President of Manhattan.

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Paper Ceilings and the Public Debt

TOWARD THE CLOSE of the second session of the 79th Congress in 1946, a group of economy-minded Republicans joined by conservative Democrats succeeded in reducing the statutory limit on the national debt from $300 billion to $275 billion.

No one seriously believed that ceilings on the debt would be a major factor in ending deficit financing. The Republicans wanted to place the Democratic President in the position of having to ask Congress for a higher limitation, thus giving them an opportunity to charge the Administration with inept debt management, bankrupting the nation by wild spending, and other fiscal and monetary sins.

For the next four years President Truman, Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder and the several directors of the Budget were successful in staying below the ceiling. Then in 1950, with the debt in the neighborhood of $257 billion, some of the same economy-minded and political-minded Republicans moved to bring the ceiling down to the $257 billion figure and force the Treasury on a pay-as-you-go basis. They declared:

> President Truman has not demonstrated that he has even the slightest intention of ever putting the Government's house in order. He prefers the easy alternative of spend-and-borrow, hoping that he will be safely out of the White House before bankruptcy strikes. His lieutenants in Congress have shown the same unwillingness to face the cold facts of life and have gone along with his policy.

In the closing days of the first session of the 83rd Congress, with a Republican President in the White House, one of this same GOP economy group, Rep. Daniel Reed (N. Y.), stood before the House and pled for an increase of the debt limitation to $290 billion. Reed declared this was necessary to protect the credit of the Federal Government. The Treasury might "squeeze through" the next five months without borrowing, he said, but it would be a dangerous risk.

"It is no answer," he declared, "that we should never have gotten into this mess."

Reed was successful in getting the House to support the request to raise the ceiling by $15 billion. But the Democrats decided to fight it in the Senate Finance Committee.

There the debt ceiling increase was turned down by a vote of 11 to four. The majority, both Democrats and Republicans, were all, by the record, economy minded. It was the old coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans. The words were the same: inept debt management, deficit financing, bankrupting the nation. But this time they were directed against a Republican President and Administration.

Republican Senators felt that they had been let down by their own Administration, both by the nature of the request and by the fact that it came in the final hours before scheduled adjournment. Republican newspapers joined in the criticism. It was a major defeat

The President may, of course, call a special session of Congress in the fall to deal with the matter. But if no increase in the present ceiling is authorized between now and the time the next regular session of the 83rd Congress convenes in January, the Administration can still operate. Treasury statistics indicate that the government will need to borrow $2.5 billion more to meet its obligations through next December. Senator Byrd, on the other hand, has offered statistics to show that the Treasury will have on hand $1.7 billion by January even without borrowing the additional $3 billion permitted by the debt ceiling. That is the basis of his opposition to an increase.

One recourse for Humphrey is to postpone government payments until after the first of the year.

Another possible expedient for Humphrey, if he actually needs more cash, is to sell some government assets to private financial houses. He could also exchange the government securities for mortgages held by the Federal National Mortgage Association. The FNMA now holds about $2 billion worth of such mortgages, and private financial groups have long advocated such disposition of them. As a last resort, President Eisenhower could order the Federal Government to halt all spending until Congress appropriates the necessary funds and raises the ceiling of the debt. The squeeze would be tight—raising the ceiling far less risky.

The Democrats, of course, find political amusement in the Administration's discomfort. They point to Adlai Stevenson's prediction last November that deficit financing and a growing debt could not be avoided in the near future. And they are digging up Eisenhower campaign quotes, such as this:

> People who pay the taxes will know where we are going. They will know that we are on our way toward a balanced budget, toward reduction in the national debt, toward lower taxes. . . .

It will have to be recorded that history has not borne this out. Last January, when the Eisenhower Administration assumed office, the national debt stood at $267 billion. Today it stands at $272.5 billion.

The actual deficit for fiscal 1953 was $9.4 billion, a peacetime record. Revenue receipts were $2.8 billion below President Truman's January estimate and $2 billion below President Eisenhower's revised estimate of May 20. Collections were seriously off in April and June of this calendar year. Democrats are charging this to the initial effects of Republican hard money policies which they say will eventually contract and depress our economy and mean even lower returns next fiscal year.

The Administration replies that it "inherited" the deficit from the Truman Administration. Sen. Wayne Morse (Ind, Ore.), a staunch opponent of increasing the ceiling, takes strong issue with the "inherited" approach:

> After the Secretary of the Treasury gets through with all his alibiing, in endeavoring to "pass the buck," so to speak . . . to the Truman Administration, the fact remains, and an analysis shows, that starting out with his hard-money policy, and the increase in the interest rates on Government bonds, which never should have been made, he, by such action as that, has increased the national debt.

Some of the cuts in appropriations which have made recent newspaper headlines will not result in any cash savings for the government until fiscal 1955. By that time some of the tax cuts which were promised by the Administration could put the government even deeper in debt.

The Republican Administration has reluctantly concluded that paper ceilings on the national debt can thwart the entire operations of a modern government. Economy-minded Senators, when they return either in the fall or in January, will have to face this distasteful fact, too.

HARRY F. CONN

Harry F. Conn is a member of the staff of the Public Affairs Institute.

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A JOURNAL OF OPINION New Republic

Editorial The Emergency for Eisenhower

IF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER does not soon alter US foreign policy to meet a new set of conditions, this nation may find itself chasing world events with little hope of catching up. But even if the President recognizes the need for a new policy and tries to effect it, he will run into the Republican Old Guard. And the death of Senator Taft gives the Old Guard a strong advantage in any showdown with Eisenhower.

Taft was more than a political strategist who placed his experience at the President's disposal. He was also a moderating influence on the Right-Wing irresponsibles and the leader of a group of Senators which, when added to the Eisenhower bloc, gave the President a strong "hard core" of Republican supporters. Now that "hard core" has shrunk and the Right Wing will be tempted to new extremes of irresponsibility just as a politically inept President faces fundamental decisions on the future shape of the world balance of power.

Since 1945 two super-powers have dominated the world. And since 1945 other powers have become increasingly restive under that domination. During the past year, the two-power system has been effectively challenged both in Europe and in Asia. Everywhere the black and white alternatives allowed by the Cold War have been protested. Under the slogan "Independence and Bread," Asians and Europeans are demanding national dignity and an acceptable standard of living.

If the period of two-power world domination is ending, the power which first fashions a policy accepting the change stands to gain the advantage. Whichever power first seeks a position as "first among equals" will retain the more strength. And strength remains essential: Russia still is determined to rule a Communist world, and the US is equally determined to live among free nations.

Russia has taken the lead in changing its policies to meet changing conditions. Fortunately, however, a position of "first among equals" is in essential contradiction to the Communist system. The needed policy transition, then, should be easier for the US. But as yet there is no indication that the present Administration realizes the need for transition.

Malenkov indicated a willingness to change policy when the people of Eastern Europe availed themselves of the only means of protest left them—strikes and uprisings. The Red Army provided a ready answer: but even as Red tanks stood guard, Malenkov tried to create the impression that the satellite people would henceforth be considered as partners, not slaves. He had already flooded Western Europe with propaganda to the effect that Russia was ready to end the Cold War whenever the West became reasonable. He urged Western Europe to free itself from US domination. Then he made minor concessions to the satellite workers. But the presence of the Red Army mocked the concessions and vitiated the propaganda.

In Asia, resistance to the Cold War and two-power domination is older than in Europe. Russia gained an advantage there when she refrained from using Syngman Rhee's release of prisoners as an excuse to scuttle the truce talks. The Communists can enlarge that advantage by first agreeing to the unification of Korea and to all-Korean elections, then withdrawing the offer when Rhee repeats his insistence that the North Koreans submit to his government and only vote for the few vacant seats in his parliament. In Asia the Red Army is a Chinese Army and its presence does not contradict Communist propaganda.

In Europe, the US has backed the parties of the Right-Center. Now these parties have lost most of their popular support. The phenomenal post-war economic gains made by Western European nations until 1950 have stopped; now there is economic stagnation. As Right-Center governments continued to ignore reform, the people moved left. Now the Right-Center cannot hold, and both the extreme Right and the extreme Left are ready to pounce. Only the moderate Left seems able to satisfy the new mood in Europe while at the same time blocking Communist expansion.

Left-Center governments in Western Europe almost certainly would be less pro-US, although no less pro-West and pro-freedom. But where both the extreme Right and Left would set up goals directly opposed to US aims, the Left-Center parties could follow a US which did not seek to dominate and which would negotiate both with them and with the Communists without first setting up impossible conditions. The extreme Right will promise and work for a European Defense Community, but their motives will be their own. The moderate Left will insist upon a different kind of EDC, one which will guard against the emergence of a militaristic German superstate. Actually, this seems the only kind of EDC, European popular sentiment will support.

But the shift to the Left in Europe gives the Asia Firsters and the economic isolationists in Congress am-

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munition with which to exploit the opportunity created by the death of Taft. If Sen. William Knowland (R, Calif.), a perfect tool for more clever men, remains as Majority Leader, they will have power as well as ammunition and opportunity.

There is little hope that Eisenhower alone can make his judgment prevail against that force through political sagacity. But by a frank appeal for sustained Democratic support and for popular pressure on the uncooperative members of his own party he could produce Congressional victories for Eisenhower policies. That would mean treating the Democrats who responded to his call as allies at all times, however, not just when it was convenient to do so. It would mean deciding that the only reliable allies are those who agree basically with his ideas on foreign policy and it would mean giving up the reckless courtship of those who have consistently rejected the Eisenhower leadership.

If no firm new coalition on foreign policy is formed to challenge the irresponsibles made reckless by the absence of Taft, Ike's enemies in the GOP will lead in Congress. And if the Republican Right Wing takes over, it will oppose the popular movement in Europe until that movement ultimately prevails despite us. It will insist we abandon Europe for Asia. In Asia too it will oppose a popular movement which will sooner or later prevail. The result of policies dictated by the Republican Right Wing could only be such a splitting of the Western Alliance as would tempt Russia into full-scale aggression.

LIKE THE Europeans, the people of Asia want an easing of Cold War tensions so they may look to development of their nations and to the easing of their daily burdens. Red China is no exception. Almost certainly it was Chinese insistence upon beginning industrialization which brought about a Korean Truce. Russia could not at once supply Chinese armies and Chinese factories; China chose the factories.

The US could encourage the popular Leftward movement in Europe and approach a Pacific conference determined to cut much of Asia out of the Cold War. Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-sek could be rejected and UN trusteeships set up in Korea and Formosa until popularly elected governments could be established. Both areas would thus be neutralized. A Left-Center French government would facilitate settling the Indo-Chinese problem on the basis of a guarantee of full independence by an agreed date plus UN territorial guarantees; then, once the ground had been cut from under his pose as "liberator," negotiations with Ho Chi Minh could be started. The question of the admission of China to the UN could be discussed by the US and its allies with an eye to compromise and brought to the UN whenever a majority of the members think it should be. If a satisfactory Pacific agreement with China seems possible, a compromise admitting her to the UN but giving her Security Council seat to India might be worked out. But before anything can be done in Asia, Eisenhower will have to choose between the conflicting promises he and Dulles have made to Rhee, Congress and our allies.

The statements made by Dulles as he prepared to leave for Korea, however, suggest that the unity of the Republican party is still the Administration's prime concern. He seems dominated by the lingering fear of negotiation so prevalent in Congress. Dulles goes to the conference table clad in the armor of an inflexible attitude inspected and approved by some very demanding Senators. But if that armor is not to be removed, if the attitude is sacrosanct, there is no point in going to the conference at all. The commitments made to Rhee and to the Republican Party cannot be reconciled with those made in the armistice agreement. Nor can they be reconciled with those implicit in our UN membership.

Someone, either Eisenhower or Dulles, must find the courage to act in terms of a platitude Dulles included in his book, "War, Peace and Change," published in 1939: "In international affairs . . . we should seek to abolish any sense of finality. 'Never' and 'forever' are words which should be eliminated from the vocabulary of statesmen." If neither finds that courage, an opportunity —perhaps the only opportunity we shall have—to lessen the area and the intensity of the Cold War will be lost.

Of course, anything Eisenhower or Dulles may do to remove much of the world from the Cold War will be denounced by the Republican Right Wing as weakening the West by encouraging neutralism. Far from being weakened by a change of policy, however, the Western Alliance would be strengthened by a France willing to collect taxes, institute social reforms, and internationalize guarantees for a free Indo-China. It would be strengthened by the alleviation of Asian and Middle Eastern suspicions which would follow the ending of colonialism in Southeast Asia and the placing of India in a position of responsibility. It would be further strengthened if the European Defense Community were replanned to ease European fears of a dominant, militant Germany. And it would be further strengthened by the abandonment of a US diplomacy based on the setting of impossible conditions.

Russia has been weakened. If the US has the foresight to meet the new mood in Europe and Asia with policies which that mood can accept, she will be further weakened. Weak, she will negotiate. And she will probably agree to neutralize areas she cannot dominate. With the Cold War and all its potentialities for explosion lessened, the world could get on about its business of finding adequate food, shelter, and clothing for a mushrooming world population. Asia and the Middle East, and eventually the whole of Africa could be brought into the twentieth century. The peoples of Europe could enjoy a rising standard of living. A realistic Defense Community, popularly supported and indicating the way to a United Europe, could be established. There would be no future for Communism. It could only shout "me too."

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The Vacuum in the Senate

The loss of Taft leaves Eisenhower alone to face the Republican Irresponsibles

by William V. Shannon

THE DEATH of Senator Taft may prove as decisive an event in the conduct of American foreign affairs as was the dismissal of Chancellor Bismarck by the young Emperor Wilhelm in Germany in 1890. The iron man of Washington is gone from the scene. The Eisenhower Administration has lost its pilot and an inept and inexperienced President is left to captain the ship alone.

Mr. Eisenhower will miss his former rival and recent mentor even more than perhaps he now realizes. Whatever treaty or political agreement Secretary Dulles brings back from the conference on Korea, if indeed he returns with any at all, will be sent for ratification to a Senate that knows no master, has no plan, and comprehends no guiding principle. The Democrats, though their posture in issues of foreign affairs has been more honorable and consistent than that of their opponents, are alert for partisan advantage. The Republicans are as deeply and dangerously divided as they were in 1919 and 1939. There are irreconcilable isolationists and modern-minded internationalists and between them a considerable company of the timid good.

A situation such as this requires a popular leader of impregnable reputation, firmness, courage and the capacity, if need be, for a measure of ruthlessness. These qualities Taft possessed. President Eisenhower is yet to demonstrate them in the hard arena of politics.

Sen. William Knowland (R, Cal.), the acting Majority Leader, is a pygmy lost in a giant's robes. He is a limited, humorless young man with a hard, narrowly logical mind uncorrupted by experience or responsibility. He has already compromised his position as the President's spokesman by his obsessive preoccupation with the interests, legitimate and otherwise, of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek. During the closing and most delicate stages of the truce negotiations, Knowland several times spoke out in defense of Rhee's views and in opposition to the official views of his own country. This kind of extraordinary behavior would not have been tolerated in a man of high public responsibility in any other country. Even if one is to presume that Knowland can contain his vagaries in the future, he still remains a man of second-rank talents and limited influence in his own party.

Looking beyond the acting leader, the President has two elderly chief lieutenants in the area of foreign affairs. They are Sen. Alexander Wiley (R, Wis.), the warmhearted though sometimes befuddled chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Sen. Alexander Smith (R, Wis.), a man who always wants to follow the righteous course but often wanders a circuitous and confused road in trying to find it.

Now the death of Taft thrusts the burden of the active management of his policies upon the President. Eisenhower, unfortunately, possesses personal qualities that may be his undoing. His mind appears to be characterized by a certain vagueness, by a large and generous optimism unfocused on any essential point, and by a willingness to compromise whether the circumstances actually require it or not. The very predilection for unspecific idealism which gives him charm as a platform speaker predisposes him to underrate the difficulties of coping with the Senate. He is a symbol of political aspiration, not an agent of political purposes. Where Eisenhower believes in harmony and teamwork and personal, man-to-man appeals, Taft craftily managed the realities of power and coerced those he could not command. The difference is simple: the Senator was a boss; the President is a fixer.

The problem confronting the Administration in negotiating a Far Eastern political settlement is complex. The United States desires the peaceful unification of Korea. It also wants to forestall a more active intervention by Communist China in the Indo-China War. The Administration hopes to achieve these objectives, however, without conceding anything to China in return. It cannot permit China to enter the UN because the House and Senate have voted unanimously against its admission. It will negotiate across the table with the Chinese Communist leaders but not acknowledge they are the real rulers of China because recognition would mean a disavowal of the Chiang regime on Formosa. Britain, India, and other powers favor important concessions to China including recognition, admission to the UN, and reopening of all trade. It may well be that the Anglo-Indian theory that

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such concessions would pacify the Chinese Communist leaders and win them away from Moscow is naïve and unfounded. If such is the Administration's firm position, then it must make clear to Rhee that Korea will not soon be unified. It must also be prepared to lend the greatest possible assistance to the French and the loyal Indo-Chinese natives in combatting a possible Chinese invasion. Finally, it must calculate the serious effects of a rift with Britain and India. It is not clear that the Administration is facing up to any of these hard alternatives.

If the Administration follows a policy somewhat along the lines advocated by Britain and India, it will then confront a grave political problem in this country and particularly in the Senate. Walter Lippmann and the other more thoughtful adherents of Eisenhower advocated his election precisely on the ground that he was the only man who had the political strength in the country to put through a necessary but unpopular Far Eastern settlement. It is also clear that Secretary Dulles took office last January with the ambition of winning lasting prestige by the attainment of a general peace in Asia. The President could sell a general settlement to the American people who are weary of war and unremitting tension. But it would take courage and political sagacity of a high order.

THE STRONGEST opponents of a settlement with China are in the President's own party. The Midwestern isolationists, who make up almost half of the Republican strength in the Senate, have become by an illogical but politically expedient chain of thought the protagonists of the idea that any settlement with China would be just this side of treason. They believe that the Korean War was useless because they don't believe in fighting limited wars to uphold the principle of collective security. The only war they seek is an unlimited war that would result in total victory over China. Generals MacArthur and Van Fleet have successively encouraged them in the belief that a victory of that kind was and is within our military power to accomplish. Any peace, therefore, that is less than completely satisfactory to Rhee would in their eyes only compound the miserable failure of Korea.

These same Republicans have acquired a vested interest in Chiang because it was to their interest to charge that the Truman Administration, and not General Chiang, lost the civil war in China. Again, General MacArthur and other military men have encouraged them in the further belief that Chiang with limited American support can reconquer China. If one accepts this premise, then obviously there is no need to negotiate.

Finally, the Republican isolationists dislike the UN because they distrust any international organization. To let another Communist power into a permanent seat in the Security Council would only confirm their view that the UN is a Communist instrument. The wisdom of Churchill's remark, "Why strain at a piglet when the pig is already inside?" escapes them.

This amalgam of opinions, prejudices and domestic political investments is an extraordinary obstacle to any peaceful solution of Far Eastern problems. The President would need something like a political bulldozer to break it down.

Knowland, his own Majority Leader, shares most if not all of these beliefs. Moreover, there is the special hazard posed by Senator McCarthy. While Senators Bricker, Jenner, Dirksen, Malone and the others hold their isolationist, Asia-First opinions out of solid conviction, McCarthy is a cynical entrepreneur. He believes in nothing except McCarthy. He is, however, slowly moving toward an open break with the Administration. What would give him a better popular issue on which to break than a "Far Eastern Munich"?

The Senate Democrats are largely united on foreign affairs, but they have no clear-cut policy on the Far East. Nor as the minority are they under any obligation to commit themselves to one. They also have many old scores to settle. They are weary of hearing about the Korean War as a "Democratic war" and of being charged with selling China down the river. They are eager to return to office and are not disposed to help the President any more than their consciences and public opinion force them. Yet Eisenhower can get no agreement through the Senate without their co-operation. He will have to cease talking about the "mess" he inherited and make bipartisanship a solid reality if he is to succeed.

In this stony field, Taft might have been successful. He was influential enough to whip some of the isolationists into line because they knew him and respected him, and he was brainy enough to outmaneuver the intransigents. He would have made bipartisanship work more easily because he had a long-standing, personal liaison with Sen. Walter George (D, Ga.), Sen. Richard Russell (D, Ga.) and other powerful Southern leaders.

Taft himself, of course, was only a partially reconstructed isolationist. A general Far Eastern settlement might not have been entirely to his liking. On the other hand, he was a supreme realist, unimpressed by the bugaboo of consistency. He was also a man with an overriding sense of party responsibility. He wanted very much to see this Administration succeed, not because he liked the President or approved of all his works, but because it was a Republican Administration, and he wanted the Republicans to stay in power a long time.

President Eisenhower would first have had to negotiate a treaty with Taft. And, one may be sure, no Presidential vagueness or Dulles diplomatic double-talk would have been permitted in those negotiations! Presuming Taft had been persuaded of the merits of the President's program, he would have kept his word and delivered the votes. No treaty with Syngman Rhee or Mao Tse-tung would have been in peril in the Senate if its members knew there was also a treaty with Taft.

Lacking such a treaty and such a pilot, the Eisenhower Administration is sailing toward rough waters.

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

The UN Asserts Its Rights

With the fighting halted, UN members press Eisenhower for flexibility in negotiation.

by Joseph P. Lash

THE SIGNING of the Korean armistice did nothing to diminish the dangerous gap between the thinking of this country and that of Western Europe and Asia on the problems of the Far East. If anything, the final throes of truce-making involved the Eisenhower Administration in a series of commitments to President Rhee and the China Lobby group of Senators that has accentuated the distrust of many of our allies and may ensure the failure of the forthcoming political conference.

Because a good part of the world thinks it sees the chance of a Far Eastern detente there was dismay over the Dulles press conference in which he said flatly he was not prepared to buy Korean unification at the price of seating Red China in the UN. Diplomatic opinion interpreted this to mean, especially since it was accompanied by additional disclosures of the extent of the US commitment to President Rhee, that the US was unprepared to negotiate at the forthcoming Korean political conference on "the outstanding issues."

UN opinion was frankly critical of a negotiating position which announces an implacable hostility to the Red regime in Peiping at the same time that it proposes to gain the acquiescence of that regime for Korean unification on terms that would constitute Korea a continuing threat to Mao Tse-tung.

Many of our friends regard this as sheer madness, understandable perhaps in terms of domestic politics and Dulles' difficulties in getting Congressional support for any kind of settlement, but bearing little relationship to international realities. However, they have taken a dim view of some of our policies and the way we conducted our diplomacy before this. What is new is that with the signing of the truce those of our NATO partners and Asian friends who do not agree with our Far Eastern policies intend to assert their differences more vigorously.

While the war was on they were deterred by the knowledge that the US was carrying the major share of the load in Korea. On several occasions—the vote branding China an aggressor, the imposition of an embargo on strategic goods, and episodes in our handling of the truce talks—our UN associates muted their disagreements out of deference to the responsibilities carried by the US. But the other day when Senator Knowland again invoked the argument that the US had furnished 90 percent of the manpower and suffered 95 percent of the casualties to justify the exclusion of India from the political conference there was perceptible irritation.

It is no overstatement to say that the end of the fighting in Korea, the soft winds blowing from Moscow, and the inflexibility of American attitudes have combined to create a most dangerous situation for American leadership. Diplomats do not say this directly but refer to the warning of the sober London *Times* after the Dulles press conference that, "The possibility of the US finding herself alone if she leaves the political conference accompanied by Mr. Rhee . . . cannot be overlooked because the policy the Administration would seem . . . to have adopted is uncompromising and the expectation that China will conform to it appears somewhat tenuous."

One immediate test of allied cohesiveness will come at the special session of the UN General Assembly that will be held August 17. That meeting is intended to be a brief, routine affair with the task of setting the date and place of the post-armistice political conference and selecting the participants. Only the last is expected to cause difficulties. While waiting for the US and China to put forward their ideas, Indian Prime Minister Nehru expressed support for a formula originally suggested by UN Assembly President Lester Pearson. The latter said the job of peace-making might be helped if the Assembly set up the conference as a round-table rather than cross-table affair such as Panmunjom had been, and Nehru added that the conference should "not be too big."

This contrasted with suggestions heard in Washington, although not formally espoused by the Administration, that Red China and North Korea and possibly the USSR represent the Communists, and the 16 nations with troops in Korea the UN. Before he flew to Seoul, Secretary Dulles said this country had ideas as to which nations should be invited to the conference, but it was not disclosing those ideas just now. Clearly whom we would want invited to a conference on a Korean settlement will be determined in part by the kind of settlement we intend to seek. An earnest of our intentions will be our attitude toward India's participation. If Knowland's speech foreshadows a veto on India, we are in for some rough sledding at the special Assembly.

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Beyond the Assembly is the conference itself with major potentialities for explosions. No one likes the Rhee ultimatum giving the conference 90 days in which to make progress toward unification or our concurrence in it. One British diplomat recalled that it took the Paris Peace Conference almost that length of time to agree on rules of procedure for the conference—and that was among allies. Moreover, few believe that the conference in the first stage can make substantial progress toward Korean unification. Some delegates see an interim period in which the wounds will be healed and the country rehabilitated before free elections can be held and the country unified. In that interim period they would regard it as a token of Communist good faith in the negotiations if the Communists agreed to have the United Nations Korean Relief Administration (UNKRA) undertake the job of relief and rehabilitation for the whole peninsula.

Others believe more may be possible if Rhee can be kept under control. All sides are on record as favoring Korean unification. The Communists had hoped, before their aggression was checked, to have the peninsula unified under their rule. Now there are indications they might be willing to see the country unified but under some form of neutralization which would remove Korea from the spheres of influence of both sides in the Cold War. Such a solution would not be unwelcome in many non-Communist capitals, especially in Asia.

But would it be acceptable to Rhee and the US? Clearly not to Rhee. He envisions unification as attaching North Korea to his Republic. He has indicated that he stands by the position he took in the fall of 1950 when MacArthur was at the Yalu—that free elections should be held only in North Korea for a minority of legislators who would be added to the National Assembly. But what about the US? Diplomats at the UN confess to profound ignorance concerning US views on Korean unification. They ask whether the US position on Korean unification may not turn out to be similar to its position on Germany unity? Unity, yes, but on terms that will keep Korea a part of the free world's defense system.

Clearly Peiping thought this was the American position when it objected to America's offer of a mutual security pact to South Korea on the grounds that it would prevent Korean unification. Nor were its fears allayed when it was subsequently disclosed that the US had agreed to Rhee's request that the pact include a provision giving the US the right to station military forces in Korea. Dulles said we did not have to exercise that right, but the UN fears the provision immensely complicates the job of bringing about a withdrawal of foreign troops.

The issue, however, that is likely to create the most mischief between ourselves and our allies relates to the status of Red China, especially the question of its representation in the UN. Before the truce, countries like Britain and Canada concurred in the US argument that the UN could not recognize a regime that was shooting down its soldiers and used this argument in turn with India which has consistently advocated the admission of Red China. Now that argument is finished, and both Britain and India have indicated they will press with renewed vigor for the seating of Mao. But to get influential Republicans in the Senate to go along with the truce Dulles has had to make the American position on the admission of Red China more inflexible than ever, asserting the questionable proposition that the US had a right to use the veto. Most UN legal opinion, which hitherto included our own experts in the State Department, consider that a Security Council decision on rival credentials is a procedural matter not subject to the veto.

The illogicality of the present US position was perhaps best illustrated by Sen. Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who assured alarmed colleagues that there was no deal under way to permit Red China to be represented at the UN, but was equally emphatic that Peiping had to be represented at the forthcoming political conference. The Communists, he said, had to be represented by "someone who can speak with authority for China." But if at the political conference, why not at the UN?

No one is quite sure how this issue will come to a head. The Russians could raise it at the special session on August 17, but there is some hope that Peiping itself may consider it premature to fight out the issue at that time. The British would like to see the matter postponed to the political conference where it should become clear whether China is genuinely interested in a Far Eastern settlement.

Before that time, however, the regular session of the Assembly will convene—in September. Should Peiping send credentials to that meeting it would take only a majority vote to accept those credentials. That would not be binding on the Security Council, but there is a 1950 resolution, voted for by the US, stating that the Assembly's attitude should be taken into account by other UN organs.

Whether Peiping's credentials could muster 31 votes is a matter of debate. Neither the British nor the Indians have any desire to make life harder for Mr. Dulles. But they have a public opinion to contend with too. The demand that their diplomats "stand up to the United States" is increasingly heard in national elections among our friends. If the latter are to show understanding of our problems and exercise flexibility, we have to reciprocate.

Indeed, if there is one prayer among our friends at the moment, it is, please, keep your policy flexible. But will the irreconcilables in the Senate permit it?

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A New Mood in Europe

As Cold War fronts disintegrate, Eisenhower is challenged to find his own new policy

by Frank Gorrell

"CHRISTIAN EUROPE" of the Center-Right is crumbling. There is a new mood in Europe, a mood Washington has not yet recognized. And the fall of Alcide De Gasperi in Italy is but dramatic evidence of that new mood at work and of Western Europe's rejection of a US leadership which fails to recognize it.

Both the protest and the crumbling have been hidden by pro-US European politicians who have substituted, in their reports to Washington, wish-fulfillment for realistic appraisals of political trends and political possibilities. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles have been told what they wanted to hear. And they in turn have told the Republican Party what it wanted to hear. The result has been a new situation in Europe but the same old US policy.

Eisenhower has continued the policies he implemented under Democratic administrations. What minor changes he has made have been designed to preserve unity in the Republican Party. He has left the making of decisions to the men he appointed to replace himself abroad. But now he is confronted with the need for a major policy decision—one only he can make.

While President Eisenhower and his advisers assumed that what was good for the Republican Party was good for the world, countries and parties in both Eastern and Western Europe began turning back toward their accustomed external and internal policies. The Cold War fronts began to disintegrate. Malenkov made a so far unsuccessful effort to ride this movement by loosening Moscow's controls and going through the motions of treating satellites more like allies. But against the new European trend toward "Independence and Bread," all Eisenhower offered was the European Defense Community as a "must." Against the drive for German unity there was only rearmament and reinstatement of the old guard—Junker if not Nazi. In France and Italy, the Communists held firm and the Socialists gained ground largely because the US offered no concrete hope for either a Four-Power meeting or for social and economic justice.

US support increasingly has been made dependent upon the meeting of politically impossible conditions. The most important implication of such a policy seems to be that the US, in Europe as well as in Asia and the Middle East, is narrowing the range of its commitments, gradually confining them to the countries and peoples that can be counted on to provide the best and biggest military divisions.

Yugoslavia, it is believed, has been preferred to Italy because the constriction of available US means will make choices inevitable; and a country of Communists who are tough, fighting anti-Soviet "dependables" is better than a country whose Communists might paralyze the military machine just when it needs to be used against the Soviets. The choice of the Arab states as against Israel, though somewhat differently motivated, seems equally clear. Spain is an example of a country whose military potential has outweighed other considerations, economic even more than ideological.

But the most important example is, of course, Germany.

The US, it seems in France and England, could scarcely be more whole-hearted than in its support of Konrad Adenauer in the forthcoming election. And the issue of that election is not merely: what kind of West Germany—farther to the Right, with Adenauer's Christian Democrats? Nor is it merely: what kind of reunified Germany? It is, above all, what kind of Europe?



The period between the election and the Big Four foreign ministers meeting (or simply after the election if, as many Europeans believe, the meeting will not take place) will start a new cycle for Western Europe. It will be the third, and each has been directly linked with the fate of Germany. The first started in May, 1947, when the Big Four foreign ministers, meeting in Moscow, failed to agree on Germany, hence making the West-East Cold War inevitable. The second began with the Big Three foreign

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ministers meeting in New York in September, 1950, which decided to end the formal state of war with Germany.

During the first cycle, the danger of war between the US and Russia steadily increased. But by 1950, the tide had begun to turn, largely because of the large-scale US support of Western Europe and also the huge US industrial-military mobilization after the start of the Korean War. During the second cycle, it has seemed to Western Europeans that the danger has slowly but steadily decreased. The issue to be decided at the start of the third cycle is whether diplomacy will improve the chances for co-existence or whether the partition of Europe is to be made permanent, with an armed conflict some time in the future the only instrument of change.

The French—and to a lesser extent the British—are concerned about the Eisenhower Administration's strongly preferential choice of Adenauer in West Germany, of a mobilized rather than a neutralized united Germany, and of such a united Germany as the potential master of Western Europe. Nor is it the implied subordination of France that is the heart of the disquietude. The reason is that there seems already to have been a basic change in the facts of power within West Germany itself.

Before Adenauer went to the US, the Germans were singing the third verse of their old national anthem—the one about unity, law and freedom for the beloved Fatherland. Since he returned, and especially since Dulles patterned the forthcoming foreign ministers meeting to the Chancellor's electoral formula, they have been singing the first verse—*Deutschland uber Alles in der Welt.*

The effect has been to make pro-US Frenchmen join with neutralists and nationalists in a desperate search for some formula for a new European balance of power. And in England, equally pro-US leaders are talking about the need for freedom *from* as well as *for* the new reunited Germany, and for security *for* as well as *from* the Russia that will emerge from the present obscure, but plainly serious internal convulsions.

For the kind of West Germany, of reunited Germany, and hence of Europe that may appear in the new cycle may respond to the steadily developing new German conception of a European super-state. Heinrich Hellwege, chairman of the German Party, and a member of the Adenauer Cabinet, told a big meeting of ex-soldiers at Hanover that nationalism for Germany was out of date. The supreme task, he said, was to save the freedom of Europe through the freedom of Germany and the freedom of Germany through the freedom of Europe. The 15,000 participants in the meeting, a large number of them wearing Horst-Wessel and Reichsführer insignia, heard 12 other speeches, and nearly all of them, including those delivered by representatives of the government, exalted a "freedom" closer to the Hitlerian definition than to modern versions.

Many of the veterans present (the purpose of the meeting being to group all of West Germany's veterans' organizations in a single, mass ex-soldiers movement) were of the Waffen SS which was judged a criminal organization by the allied war-crimes court in Nuremberg. Former General Herbert Gille was cheered when he said it was a great honor to speak for the Waffen SS "who had fought only in duty to Germany." Then, he was given a delirious ovation when he added that the 300,000 Waffen SS dead had "died not for a political party but for Europe."

The French and the British, quite logically, recognize that if German troops are to share in the defense of Europe, pride of place will have to be given to those veterans of the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht who, as the only soldiers to have fought the Red Army for four years, can consider themselves the authentic forerunners of European defense. But even the most ardently pro-US and pro-Atlantic Frenchmen and Englishmen are not sure it is "senseless," as Dulles has said, to oppose preferential US treatment for a Germany whose definition of internationalism is Hellwege's and of Europe that of General Gille of the Waffen SS.

This kind of US policy together with Russia's seeming weakness have caused Western Europeans to seek a third alternative different from the black and white choice offered by the Cold War. They want independence from both the US and Russia, and they want bread.

A climate of class war now prevails among French wage earners. The whole people is farther to the Left than is parliament. The French workers feel they have less than nothing to expect from "above" now that French big businessmen and reactionary politicians have the support of their counterparts in the US. In Italy the young people are going farther Left, many all the way to Communism—for want of a successful appeal among the democratic parties. The East Berlin uprising was led by workers, most of them young. If these young men could vote in a free all-Germany election, it is most likely that they would carry the Social Democrats to power over Konrad Adenauer, regardless of US support.

The real choice confronting Eisenhower in Western Europe no longer is between the US-supported Right or Right-Center democracy against the Communists. The choice increasingly is between some new formation, some developing amalgam of democratic socialism, sturdily pro-West though not altogether pro-US, against both the Communists and those men of the Right who falsify the issues for Americans and betray the interests of their own people.

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The Battle of the Bosses

In New York, party leaders are split and the voters are angry in an election which may doom the old-style machines.

by Gus Tyler

IMPELLITTERI

FOR THE SECOND time in more than a full generation, the Democratic Party of New York City will run a full-scale primary fight for the top posts in the municipal government this fall. At stake will be the government of the great metropolis plus control of the Democratic Party in New York State. The public clash will be between Mayor Vincent R. Impellitteri and Robert F. Wagner Jr., Borough President of Manhattan, reaching out for the Mayoralty. Behind the scenes is the clash between James Farley and Ed Flynn for control of the State Democratic organization.

In 1925, the New York Democrats ran a city wide primary for mayor when the bosses of Brooklyn, Queens and Richmond backed John Hylan to succeed himself as Mayor and the bosses of the Bronx and Manhattan favored James Walker. Now once again, the organizations in Brooklyn, Queens and Richmond back a mayor to succeed himself while the Bronx and Manhattan put forth the challenger.

Unlike 1925, however, Democratic nomination is not at all tantamount to election this year. The party that once held New York in its vest pocket is now challenged both from within and without. Many see in the present Democratic split a repetition of 1933 when the Democrats were divided between O'Brien and McKee and, as a result, LaGuardia moved into City Hall. This likelihood is presaged by the very strong popular standing of Rudolph Halley, incumbent President of the City Council and Liberal Party candidate for Mayor.

In a poll conducted by the *Daily News*, Rudolph Halley was front runner with 22 percent of the vote; Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., second with 17 percent; Impellitteri third with 13 percent; Judge Samuel Leibowitz fourth with 12 percent. This poll, with an amazing history of accuracy behind it, played a major role in shaping the tickets for the New York election. On June 15, the *Daily News*, with no personal preference for Halley, wrote: "Rudolph Halley is the people's choice for Mayor—as of now." Democratic politicos, who might normally have brushed aside the poll-takers, remembered 1950 when the same poll predicted the election of Impellitteri over all regular party candidates.

With full recognition of the threat Halley represents to continued boss rule of New York City, the five county leaders were unable to agree on a strategy. James Roe of Queens and Jeremiah Sullivan of Richmond favored Impellitteri. They had favored him in 1950 when he ran as an "independent" against the Democratic and Liberal nominee, Ferdinand Pecora; they still favor him. Ed Flynn and Carmine DeSapio, of the Bronx and Manhattan, opposed "Impy": they had opposed him in 1950, and they felt that his stock had fallen considerably since 1950. Kenny Sutherland, the new boss of Brooklyn, held the decisive vote and he finally declared for Impy—because, it is said, Impy threatened to split the Democratic vote by running independently once more.

Among the five county leaders, the vote was three to two for Impellitteri. Now Flynn and DeSapio, lined up behind Robert F. Wagner Jr., are reaching out for the Democratic rank and file on primary day.

In this fight Impellitteri has the advantage of being the Mayor with all the popularity and patronage that goes with the job. He has many disadvantages that come with being a popular hero whose clay feet are showing. Swept into office as an independent, he appointed Frank Sampson, former Tammany leader, as his patronage dispenser. He appointed Hugo Rogers, top man of Tammany, to one city post and Harry Brickman, a local Tammany man with underworld shadings, to another post. Voters, who in 1950 were glad not to remember Impy's Tammany past, now began to recall him as the man who in May, 1950 had volunteered that: "Everything that I have received in public life I owe to Tammany Hall."

WAGNER

Robert F. Wagner has the advantage of his name: son of New Deal Sen. Bob Wagner. He has the further advantage of a liberal stand on public issues. He sided with Rudolph Halley on the Board of Estimate in opposing major policy stands of the Impellitteri administration. His one great disadvantage is the fact that he is the favorite son of the Tammany organization.

Behind Impellitteri many profess to see the skilled

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hand of James Farley reaching out for control of the Democratic Party in the state. No one quite knows who Farley's choice would be for the gubernatorial candidate in 1954, but it seems that he will do all he can to deny the nomination to Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr.

While Democratic Party leaders are maneuvering for position and power this year and next, the voters of New York are looking forward to the election to voice their frustration and anger.

In 1950, Impy looked like the answer. His most bitter opponents this year are hundreds of thousands of his disappointed followers of 1950. This great army of fickle, unfettered, and vengeful voters know their power. They proved that *they* and *not* Impy were the real powerhouse in 1950 when all major and minor party organizations were overwhelmed at the polls. The voters proved it in 1951 when they turned out to elect Rudolph Halley as President of the City Council. Halley was elected over the Democratic candidate, who had Impellitteri's backing as well as that of the regular party. Halley's campaign was not only a simple recapitulation of the Kefauver findings but also a scathing attack on Impy's brief administration. His election, over Democrat and Republican, on the Liberal ticket gave the voters confidence that they could lick any machine.

HALLEY

The anger of the voters has been multiplied by Governor Dewey's treatment of the great metropolis. He has denied to New York a fair share of the state's aid to cities. He led the fight for a 15-percent rent increase. He imposed a new transit authority on the city that has upped the fare from 10 cents to 15 cents a ride. He has given the voters new reasons to vent their anger. In 1950 and 1951, it was "Down with Tammany." Now it is "Down with Tammany and Dewey."

Many voters feel that the new burdens on the city are the joint responsibility of Dewey and Impy. It was charged that Dewey had the New York Republicans give backdoor support to Impy in 1950. The motive was to continue the old Dewey-O'Dwyer combine. (The Republican Governor of the state shall not oust the Democratic Mayor of New York City *provided* that the Mayor shall be the servile deputy of the Governor.)

Dewey's harsh treatment of the metropolis made the traditional kind of fusion between Republicans and Liberals in New York City a virtual impossibility. The only way in which New Yorkers could show their anger against Dewey this year was to cast their vote against the Republican candidate for Mayor, no matter who he was. For a while, it appeared that Rep. Jacob Javits, a Republican with a liberal voting record in Washington, might unite the Republican and Liberal parties. Thanks to the "Dewey-package" for New York City, liberal-minded voters with a good deal of personal fondness for Javits vowed to vote against him this year as a rebuke to the Republican Party.

Up to the last minute, Democrats and Republicans were hoping to unite on District Attorney Frank Hogan. Had this happened, New York voters would have had a candidate who could not say whether he was for or against more state aid, for or against the rent increase, for or against the fare rise. What weighed more heavily with Democratic Party leaders was the feeling that Hogan would lose the Democratic primary if he went into the contest with the GOP label on him.

Although Halley was the popular poll candidate before any of the parties made their choices, neither the Democrats nor the Republicans offered him the nomination. In the case of the Democrats, this is altogether understandable since he stands as the arch-foe of Tammany and its satellite county machines. In the case of the Republicans, to whom the Liberals offered a coalition around Halley, a Democrat, the motive is not so clear, unless it is to continue the old arrangement to let a weak and obedient Democrat run the city while the GOP sits in Albany *ad infinitum*.

The New York picture is further complicated by the decision of the City Fusion Party to fuse with nobody. It is running Judge Samuel Leibowitz, the famous and brilliant trial lawyer, as its candidate for Mayor. At this writing, Leibowitz also threatens to enter the Democratic Party primary. If he does he will be the fourth candidate to do so, since Robert Blaikie, rebel Democratic leader of New York's West Side, has also thrown his hat into the primary ring.

The race is wide open and the track is crowded. With the Republicans naming Postmaster Harold Riegelman, there will be at least four major candidates: Reigelman, the Republican; Leibowitz, the Fusionist; Halley, the Liberal; and the Democrat—Wagner or Impellitteri. Should Impellitteri lose the nomination, he may run anyhow to give New Yorkers a fifth choice. And, of course, the American Labor Party is running Clifford McAvoy, although there is some reason to believe that the Communists think their ALP creature is a bit too sectarian and that the "left" should really be busy in some more massive struggle of the people.

In such a wide field, Halley's basic strength among the electorate as a popular enemy of the underworld, as a consistent opponent of Impellitteri, as a steady foe of Dewey may prove enough to give him the election. Should Democrats remain divided after the primary, as well as before, Halley's chances are multiplied.

One thing the Gotham voter has accomplished by his repeated revolts in the last few years: he has broken the monopoly of the politicians on politics. New York is no longer a city where the boss gives the word and the city cries amen. This November the two million enrolled Democrats in New York can get into a good, hot primary battle with four choices and, if they don't like the result, they can take a second crack at cleaning up in November.

Whatever the outcome, it looks like another chapter in the passing of the old-type machine!

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LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

PROGRESS IN MUSIC

by Robert Evett

IF WESTERN MUSIC were, like most of the other arts, supported by a really long tradition, the issue of present and future progress in music would perhaps be less important. If, for instance, there were extensive musical pieces dating back to the time of Euripides, or even going back a thousand years, music as we know it would seem less new. The fact is that only a few fragments have survived the Greco-Roman era. Even the music of the Middle Ages, which can be reconstructed and performed, was left by its composers in such a vague and fragmentary form that the authenticity of its modern interpretations can never finally be proved.

The supreme accomplishment of the Middle Ages in music was the development of a notation, a system of committing sounds and rhythms to the page in writing; all music composed before the perfection of this system is at least partially lost. The development of large, elaborate forms has been predicated on the notational system, which was usable as early at 1400, but very cumbersome. Refinements in style and technique followed refinements of notation consistently, but the earliest really sophisticated styles are not much more than four hundred years old. Because of this, music is the infant of the arts, a recent arrival, hundreds of years behind literature, painting, sculpture and architecture. The classical period of music is not Greco-Roman antiquity: it is the late eighteenth century, and Mozart is its Virgil.

The lack of a long tradition seems to make musicians, especially composers, inordinately jittery about the future. Music is alone among the arts in that its relatively brief history has, in the main, been one of clear and obvious progress. Some musicians feel that the progress reached its zenith in the music of the High Baroque, especially in the work of J. S. Bach, and that subsequent changes have been less progressive in character. Others trace an unbroken line of progress from the Gregorian Chant to the present day, and see that line continuing, unchecked and at the same greatly accelerated speed, into an apparently unlimited future.

We are accustomed to using the word "progress" ambiguously, applying it to either general or personal improvement. To recognize progress in the development of an individual talent is easy; it is more difficult to recognize in music generally. To accept trend as a phenomenon in and of itself progressive is to follow Hegel and the Marxists into that curious (and rosy) view of evolution which considers practically everything a step in the right direction, and which puts all artists at the mercy of historical processes. Arnold Schoenberg, who tended to think of music history as a general onward-and-upward movement, felt that progress was a divinely inspired thing, that the composer who set his own taste higher than the gift of God would end up, like Jonah, inside the whale; Schoenberg preferred to prophesy at the gates of Nineveh.

I suppose that the first criterion of progress is some kind of recognizable improvement. The word "recognizable" here is, of course, dangerous, since not everyone is capable of recognizing a change for the better. However, change is easily discernible, and few would be naïve enough to assert that a chonological accident had made the music of Rossini or Weber superior to that of Mozart or J. S. Bach. The comparison, of course, is unfair at the outset, since Weber and Rossini were not composers of the first rank. The worth of the historical view of progress must be tested by comparing the output of the best composers of different periods.

This issue is generally side-stepped. We like to say that we like Beethoven and Mozart equally in different ways, that Mozart is subtle where Beethoven is sublime, and so on. There is certainly no question that, in his major work, Beethoven introduced a kind of passion and grandeur not to be found in earlier music; at the same time, he introduced a kind of coarseness, an obviousness, an element of the gross, which music could have done without very nicely, and which had to supercede the subtleties of the eighteenth century if the new style were to have the effect for which it was intended. Beethoven's achievement, while not the first of its kind in music, is a superb illustration of the composer-*qua*-Shiva, destroying as he creates.

Since Beethoven's time, the destruction of the past has become a part of the working process of those musicians who feel that they are helping things along to make progress in music in a progressive way. Wagner and Liszt, for instance, expanded harmonic language while making a frontal attack on form. Schoenberg, whose work was aimed, at least in part, on the destruction of a whole system of harmonic and melodic conventions while building up another system of tonal relationships, frequently relied on the most rigid of antique forms. If the evolution from Liszt through Schoenberg is progress in the Hegelian sense, it is a strange brand, since it goes backwards and forwards at the same time.

In that these composers and, especially during the past fifty years, a great many others, have added enormously to the technical resources of music (and, in some instances, actually extended the aesthetic frontiers of the art) they have provided that recognizable improvement which, in spite of the destructive element in their work, could be used to support the historical view. In that their innovations have, in many instances proved to be only an *embaras de richesse*, impeding their work, the innovations would tend to seem actually regressive. The most pathetic example of this auto-frustration is probably that of Schoenberg, whose heart, as he constanly reminded us, was off in *Verklaerte Nacht* a-chasing the deer, while his head was contriving a system to put an end to all such nonsense. The compromise at which he finally arrived, of writing alternately in old and new styles, was one man's tragedy. But his thinking, brilliant and logical as it was, has provoked a catastrophe in the musical art and in the work of dozens of

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smaller composers. Schoenberg's metaphysics relieves the composer of personal responsibility; it makes him a vessel through which the music simply flows, whether he likes it or not.

It is not Schoenberg's technique which makes this true. Such composers as Alban Berg and Luigi Dallapiccola, to whom Schoenberg's method is subject to their own personal wills, have found their personalities in Schoenberg's technique. Schoenberg himself did not wish to have his method imitated by people who did not understand it, and, unfortunately, this irresponsible imitation is epidemic in the world at present. However, without the onward-and-upward view, composers would not feel the need—indeed, moral responsibility—for adopting styles and methods developed by others, styles which they themselves find abstruse.

The act of musical creation is one of the most personal, private occupations that a human being can undertake. The kind of music anyone writes, or whether he writes at all is, finally, his own business. To assume, as Schoenberg did, that change in musical method is divinely dictated, is to make God party to some outrageous practical joke. To assume that historical processes inexorably dictate change is to dispose, once and for all, of the spiritual nature of music, reducing it to a mechanical operation.

I would suggest that any real progress in music is a private matter, something that evolves in a lively musical mind and constitutes a development of the resources of that mind. Personal advancement takes on general significance only insofar as it becomes part of the experience of the musical community, stimulating and shaping the thought of other minds. Because of this, a responsible composer will find or assimilate into his technique only those elements which he needs for his work; and these elements may as well be drawn from the past—perhaps the remote past—as the present. A revaluation of the past can inaugurate a tremendous personal evolution.

Paul Hindemith, a composer who totally rejects the notion of progress as an historical process, gives particularly eloquent testimony to the case of progress as a personal and private affair. Hindemith's early music sounds like Brahms, and not like very good Brahms, but the elements of his own style are there. Between the end of the first World War and 1922, the main elements of Hindemith's style crystallized. From that date until the early thirties, that style was in a process of continuous refinement, as Hindemith's assimilated the *methods*, minus the manners, of the past.

The perfected style, as we find it in *Mathis der Maler*, has not changed noticeably in twenty years, and it will never change, because Hindemith knows exactly what he is doing and why. A composer as solidly rooted as Hindemith has no more need to change style than Bach or Mozart would. Hindemith is eclectic in the literal and best sense of the word, since his knowledge of the past is so exhaustive that every successful technique ever employed is part of his equipment.

Bela Bartok was eclectic, too, in a rather more limited way. His major influences were Beethoven, Liszt, and the folk musicians of the Balkans. It is probably the folk music which sustained his equilibrium during the Central European musical upheavals of thirty years ago. Again, his evolution was a personal one. It produced a rich, distinguished style, impossible to imitate, but with only a few technical eccentricities (most of them harmonic and rhythmic) which could be of use to other musicians.

To list the composers, from Debussy to Peter Mennin, who have built personal styles on a careful analysis of existing music with a view to preserving existing traditions, is to account for the stylistic richness of this century so far. The lack of a common practice in twentieth century music can be considered a weakness, and in that it encourages charlatanry, it is. But the lack of stylistic orthodoxy encourages the maximum development of the lively mind. Exponents of the historical view of progress feel that our great stylists are outside the mainstream of the art, have divorced music from its mission and its meaning, and are a thoroughly pernicious crew. The stylists tend to believe that the road from Beethoven to Wagner to Schoenberg leads straight to hell. This reminds one, of course, of the old Brahms-Wagner feud, which Wagner seems to have won. At present, there are two camps, armed, neither of which is willing to yield. On the matter of progress, however, there seems to be one point of agreement, which is that progress, whatever it may really be, can not come out of a literal imitation of antique styles.

[*This is the first section of a two-part essay.*—The Editors]

A HUMAN FREUD

ERNEST JONES' book succeeds in making Freud human without making him any the less great; indeed, as we learn through this remarkable biography to understand better the quality of Freud's day-to-day life, his intellectual achievement stands out as all the more astonishing. Dr. Jones brings to his task not only many years' association with Freud and his thought, not only a thorough study of previously unpublished letters (including many of Freud to his fiancée and the fabulous find of the "Fliess correspondence" in which the germ of many of Freud's seminal conceptions are set forth, along with the new problems the new discoveries presented), but also a grasp of the state of nineteenth century science in Central Europe and what this meant for Freud. The whole is a labor of love, but also one of judiciousness: the British (or Canadian) fairness which so many Viennese, Freud included, greatly admired, is at its best here, and so far as possible Freud is presented straight.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD, by Ernest Jones (Basic Books; $7.50).

Judiciousness is also apparent in the excellent job of selection Dr. Jones has done, among the mass of items with a claim to relevance. Thus, he has used Freud's letters sparingly, to illustrate a theme rather than to overpower the reader. And his treatment of the scientific background (drawing on the fine essays of Siegfried and Suzanne Cassirer Bernfeld as well as on other material) does not fall into the temptation its fascination would present of becoming a treatise on intellectual history: it keeps its eye steadily on where Freud was from point to point in his scientific career. Likewise, Dr. Jones avoids psychoanalytic interpretations of the data he uncovers, though undoubtedly his own psychoanalytic experience—an experience, after all, which continuously confronts him with biographical fragments—has helped direct his search for data and his presentation of it. One puts down this book as one would a detective serial, impatient for the next instalment; and in fact, as we follow Freud on the trail of some of his most significant ideas and of what he lived through in the course of them, the account man-

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ages to reconvey the original excitement of the chase.

How different these struggles of Freud from those which Harrod has recently shown us in his life of John Maynard Keynes! For the latter, everything came easily—charming, intellectual friends; grasp of abstruse logical and mathematical matters; fondness for art and ballet. Keynes, not having to look after his fortunes too strenuously, or, so far as appears, to fight his own weaknesses, could throw himself into world political and economic battles with a sunny confidence. Freud, however, confident and worldly as he may have appeared in later years, attained this plateau, as Ernest Jones makes clear, by the most heroic efforts. At forty we see him dependent on the support and approval of Herr Fliess, a man whose fondness for numerology may have played somewhat the same morale-building part in Freud's work that cybernetics seems to play for some contemporary social scientists. At this time Freud stands on the threshhold of his self-analysis—this unique act in the annals of integrity and intellect. His friends are a group of Jewish Viennese medical men, with several of whom he plays cards. His work includes much anxious waiting for patients, and when they come Freud doubts his power to help them and indeed his gift for medicine. Ernest Jones, far better than any other biographers, has shown how from these quite unsunny beginnings there developed Freud's historic break-through into a new understanding of man, along with a new understanding and new control of himself.

DAVID RIESMAN

[*This book, recently published in England, will soon be issued in the US.*—The Editors]

THE USE OF HISTORY

IN 1944 the Nazi terror blotted out the fine intelligence that was Marc Bloch; he had joined the French Resistance, was captured, tortured and shot. This book, therefore, remains a fragment, perhaps five-sevenths complete; but truncated as it is, it has a grace and dignity that the most polished work of lesser men fails to attain.

THE HISTORIAN'S CRAFT, by Marc Bloch (Knopf; $3).

What started it was a question that his small son put to Bloch: "Tell me, Daddy. What is the use of history?" In Vichy, France, almost cut off from books and notes, Bloch set himself to frame an answer that should satisfy not easily appeasable seventy, but implacable seven—"implaccable" is his own word. He did not succeed—he would have been a miracle-worker if he had—but he went so far toward success that his book is a stimulant and a delight to the non-historian, however wryly it may be received by part of the faculty.

Joseph R. Strayer, who contributes an introduction, remarks that Bloch's style is difficult, which may be true of the originable, but Peter Putnam's translation is admirably lucid, and he complains only of the state of the manuscript, studded with elisions and interpolations, sometimes written on the back of the sheet, for the author was not given time to make a fair copy.

But it is conceivable that the very difficulties under which the work was written may have contributed somewhat to make it a better answer to the boy's question than it would have been had Bloch been surrounded by all the tools of scholarship. He could not quote *verbatim*, since verification was often impossible, but he was a born phrase-maker and one suspects that he sometimes got the sense of a passage better than the original author had put it. Anyhow, he shared Malebranche's scorn for mere "polymathy" and his immense erudition supports the work invisibly.

No layman should pontificate on anything as abstruse as a theory of history, but I think most non-professional readers will be struck by the admirable balance of Bloch's ideas. He dislikes addicts of footnotes, the most useful part of whose work "must be looked for in the cellar," but he is contemptuous of the reader who resents any footnotes at all. Text-books are "always admirable tools of sclerosis," yet we have them. Method is indispensable, yet "man spends his time devising techniques of which he afterwards remains a more or less willing prisoner."

The very essence of the historian's craft, however, is ability to ask the right questions, to know before you start what it is that you want to find out. This could be tortured into an argument for starting with a preconceived opinion, but it is nothing of the sort. Bloch is simply asserting that the wise man is he who understands clearly what and where are the gaps in his own knowledge, a theory backed by the formidable authority of Socrates.

The Historian's Craft is not and was not intended to be a technician's manual, but many a professional will read it for entertainment if not for instruction; and every professional should recommend it to laymen, for it will not only inform the average layman, but will greatly enlarge his respect for the craft.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

PREHISTORIC PAINTING

SEVENTY-FIVE years ago a little girl was playing in a cave in northwestern Spain. Noticing a painted animal above her head, she shouted, excitedly, "Toro! Toro!" Attracted by her cries, her father, an archaeologist, rushed to the scene, and found the ceiling of the cave covered with beautiful polychrome frescoes depicting bisons and other animals. After many years of dispute, and after the discovery of similar murals in French caves, scholars decided that these amazing works of art must be creations of hunters who had lived in Western Europe towards the end of the Ice Age, between 30,000 and 10,000 years B. C.

ART IN THE ICE AGE, by Johannes Maringer and Hans-Georg Bandi (Praeger; $12.50).

That cave of Altamira became known as the "Sistine chapel of the Ice Age." The present volume contains superb reproductions of some Altamira pictures as well as similar murals of Lascaux, in southwestern France, where a cave, accidentally discovered by school boys in 1940, was dubbed the "Louvre of the Ice Age." Messrs. Maringer and Bandi, who assembled the pictorial material and wrote the text, are pupils of the late Swiss archaeologist, Hugo Obermeier. They have produced a very attractive, valuable reference work which should prove interesting to the general reader and to the scholar. Not confining themselves to the palaeolithic paintings, they also discuss the sculptures of the Cro-Magnon man which, hyperstylized and often grotesque, are akin to works by Brancusi or Modigliani.

Those paintings, made inside the mountains are, however, the most striking human accomplishments of the Up-

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per Old Stone Age period. The subject matter is chiefly game—wild horse, bison, bear, reindeer, mammoth, stag, lion—upon which primitive man depended for his existence, using their flesh, furs, hides, bones, horns, and ivory. The motive was not *l'art pour l'art* but the attainment of practical aims: by painting these pictures, the artists performed a magic which they hoped would cause these animals to succumb to their power, assure their capture or destruction.

Yet, whatever the purpose, the Cro-Magnon painters and engravers attacked their unwieldy material with a firm hand and an astonishing artistic talent. Illuminating the caves with tiny lamps, and working with simple tools, and with colors made from minerals or burnt bones, they had a remarkable feeling for shapes, and an unerring visual grasp of animal form. Keen observers, these "savages" had an extraordinary memory for instantaneous poses, and they even recorded faithfully the characteristics of each individual animal. Not before the drawings of the Renaissance Italian, Pisanello, have such accurate and graceful animal pictures been made. The most astonishing feature expressed in these works is the selectivity, the tendency to leave out unnecessary details and concentrate on the important facets.

The volume also contains chapters on "The Art of the Spanish Levant," and on "Arctic Art." Fifty years ago, tiny paintings, chiefly in red or reddish brown, were discovered in the mountain ranges of Eastern Spain. These picture cycles are important, for they show people in varying positions and occupations and furnish a record of human life in the Upper Palaeolithic and the Mesolithic era; curiously enough, the human bodies are usually exaggerated or distorted in a way reminiscent of twentieth century Expressionism. Precious samples of Arctic Art were found in Scandinavia, Finland, northern Russia and Siberia. We find them discussed here because, although later than the Ice Age Art, they are stylistically rooted in the creations of late Arignacian Art, a subdivision of Ice Age Art.

Full praise must be given to the gorgeous color plates, and the numerous other illustrations, halftones and line cuts. This magnificent volume, furnished with maps, bibliography and index, is altogether a praiseworthy accomplishment in publishing. ALFRED WERNER

THE POLITICAL FARMER

IF ONE were compelled to prescribe a single vantage point for an understanding of the uniqueness of American politics, he might well advise that the republic be viewed through the window of agrarianism. And the qualities of agrarianism itself could be very well discerned through an analysis of the American Farm Bureau Federation.

Mr. McConnell's book makes a respectable contribution toward filling the need for independent study and evaluation of the AFBF. He deals mainly with the history, policies, methods of operation, and organization of the AFBF and his materials on these matters make an enlightening case study in modern pressure politics. Yet the chief interest of the book consists not so much in its detailed account of the AFBF but in the broad interpretative context in which that account is placed.

THE DECLINE OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY, by Grant McConnell (California; $3.75).

Agrarianism historically contributed disproportionately to the American political tradition. A society in which most people were farmers and in which any farmer could aspire to 160 acres in fee simple was hospitable to ideas of freedom and equality as well as hostile toward concentrations of political and economic power. Mr. McConnell sees the critical characteristic of historic agrarianism as that of opposition to the development of power, be it the power of class, of finance, of manufacturing, or of others, an opposition that was the corollary of the notions of liberty and egalitarianism reflective of the myths, if not always of the actualities, of agriculture. As the bearer of such doctrines, a theoretically classless agrarianism fought not only for itself but for all believers in democracy. The Jacksonian attacks on the Bank of the United States were of a piece with the Populists assaults on monopoly. Class power was the enemy.

The great transformation of agrarianism of this century repudiates the traditional agrarian distrust of power. Not only has agrarianism dried up as a source of egalitarian and democratic doctrine that percolated through the whole of society and made all Americans more or less farmers at heart. Even within the precincts of agriculture itself a great structure of power has been erected. That structure is itself narrowly based within agriculture but purports to speak for all the farmers, a bit of humbuggery which, although Mr. McConnell does not make the point, may be got away with because of the hold of the old ideas about agrarianism on the American mind. The internal necessities of the new organization of power seem to be such that its leaders must ever exert themselves to maintain, enlarge, and extend their power, even as an end in itself, lest the organization perish. Thus, the AFBF seems to displace government and political parties as the initiator of farm policy. If Mr. Benson determines to be his own Secretary of Agriculture instead of the Farm Bureau's, he will encounter the same troubles that beset Mr. Brannan. It seeks to destroy rival farm organizations. It seeks to convert even government to its own service. In all these tendencies the AFBF is not alone among organized groups, but the paradox of concentration of power in the agrarian sector of society provides an especially impressive index of a broad and fundamental alteration in the nature of American politics. That the aims of organized agriculture from time to time conflict with the public interest gives less cause for alarm "than does the fact that the conditions of power exclude so large a part of the farm population from the benefits of the political process."

A gross summary of the argument may convey the impression that Mr. McConnell overstates the significance of agrarianism in American political thought. Perhaps he does a bit. Yet his analysts will be most suggestive to those who are disposed to ponder about the state to which the American democracy has evolved. V. O. KEY JR.

THE RECORD REVIEW

THE HAMMERKLAVIER SONATA, by Ludwig van Beethoven, transcribed for orchestra by Felix Weingartner (Urania).

ALTHOUGH it was made many years ago, Weingartner's transcription of the *Hammerklavier Sonata* has never taken on popularity in this country—perhaps, because Dr. Stokowski has taught us to be leery of transcriptions.

This is a transcription of a different order. It is faithful to the composer's own score, and it is orchestrated in a style which only occasionally departs

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from the characteristic Beethoven sound. The transcription itself is justified by the fact that, as a piano piece, the *Hammerklavier* almost always sounds pretty bad. The piano lacks both the tonal contrast and sustaining power necessary for a work of this size, a piece which, because of its outrageous difficulty of execution is as well suited to the wrestling ring as to the concert stage. The one thing of which one is always aware at a performance of this work in its original form is the brutal intensity of its conception.

Effortlessly performed by an orchestra, the sonata takes on a clarity and a charm that it lacks in its original form. Unfortunately, it loses both its grandeur and its bite. This performance, by Kurt Graunke and the Bavarian Symphony Orchestra, sounds very good.

LA MER and PRELUDE A L'APRES MIDI D'UN FAUN, by Claude Debussy; INTRODUCTION AND ALLEGRO by Maurice Ravel (Columbia "Entré Series).

This record, which sells for a low price, is a bargain. The Ravel work which is surely one of his best, is given a beautiful performance by excellent soloists, including John Cockerill and Reginald Kell. The Debussy works are given a quite adequate reading by Alceo Galliera and the Philharmonia Orchestra. The recording is good.

SYMPHONY IN B FLAT MINOR, by Sir William Walton (HMV).

Sir William's Symphony, which has quite a lot of jazzed-up Sibelius in it and is much too long, is still (after almost twenty years) a lively piece. Brilliantly orchestrated, its manner is essentially mock-serious. It clatters around, makes a furious noise, and can be very amusing. Walton himself conducts the Philharmonic Orchestra, and does so very well.

SYMPHONY NUMBER FOUR, by Jan Sibelius (Mercury Classics).

Mercury Classics has engaged Sixten Ehrling and the Stockholm Radio Orchestra to record all of the Sibelius Symphonies. The orchestra itself is very good, the engineering is fine, and Mr. Ehrling seems to have an uncommon sympathy for the music. Time, however, has been singularly hard on the Fourth Symphony. The dissonances which gave it a claim to distinction forty years ago have become commonplace, leaving the piece insubstantial and, for the most part, painfully, depressingly, inordinately slow.

The fact that the Sibelius Fourth tends to pall at this time does not, in itself, detract from the value of the projected series. The first three symphonies are extremely convincing old-fashioned works. The last three, if not stylistically characteristic of this century, are the work of a composer at the height of his creative phase. The Fourth, the piece in the middle, is the center and crux of Sibelius' work, but it is still an imperfect experiment. Reviving it now, when the Sibelius cult is at an all-time low, is a nice, but empty, gesture. R.E.

A VIRTUOSIC ECONOMIST

SOME INSTINCT, perhaps of survival, has been at work among economists in the last few months. We have had collections of essays written by John Williams, a reluctant theorist, and by Roy Harrod, an eager theorist. Before us are a group of short pieces by Simon Kuznets whose fame derives from his statistical rather than his theoretical contributions to economics. His reputation does him an injustice, as these essays prove once more, for in them as in his other published work, Mr. Kuznets combines the tremendous technical virtuosity for which he is justly celebrated with keen theoretical insight into the sociological and philosophical implications of his economic devices.

ECONOMIC CHANGE, by Simon Kuznets (Norton; $4.50).

The essays themselves cover a wide range of subjects, among them business cycles, national income and economic growth. Kuznets is a fair-minded critic of other men's work. His discussion of Joseph Schumpeter's theory of business cycles, for example, is a humane but destructive demonstration that innovation is no adequate explanation of economic rhythms. A penetrating examination of an alternative explanation cyclical expansion, the acceleration principle, leaves it in no better shape than the theory of innovation.

The most interesting parts of this very clearly written volume concentrate upon the connection between national income and economic welfare. And it is here that Mr. Kuznets displays most completely his relentless determination to pursue his favorite topic far beyond the conventional boundaries of the economic statistician. He does not stop when he has achieved dollar values for national income. He asks and partially answers a number of crucial questions. How fully do dollar magnitudes measure our economic welfare? How can we really measure the economic contribution of government? How many of the factors which contribute to economic welfare do we neglect because we measure only items which pass through a market or for which we can construct a market analogy? How much meaning remains in international comparisons of national income in view of the enormous differences among nations in industrial structure, family arrangements, and consumer demand? These are searching questions and they evoke from Mr. Kuznets provisional conclusions calculated to disturb American complacency about our own position and progress. Mr. Kuznets suggests that the differences between our standard of living and those of other nations, while substantial, is not as great as national income statistics indicate and that improvements in our standard of living over the last century or so have probably been overstated. Nor does he expect the rate of expansion in output to be as great in the future as it has been in the past.

Enough has been said to indicate the reviewer's belief that the general reader has an exceptional opportunity in this volume to accompany with a minimum of pain one of the sharpest economic minds among us on a number of explorations which sketch the present limits and the future possibilities of the almost science of economics.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

Notes on the Critics

DAVID RIESMAN is the author of *Faces in the Crowd*. GERALD W. JOHNSON, historian and TV commentator, is an *NR* Contributing Critic. ALFRED WERNER is a physician and an art historian. V. O. KEY JR., a professor at Harvard, is an *NR* Contributing Critic. ROBERT LEKACHMAN is a professor of economics at Barnard College.

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From Our Readers

Politics in Higher Education

State universities have their own eternal triangles — legislature, trustees, university president. Ordinarily there is no reason why the three-sided relationship should not be harmonious and flexible to the degree that the president can carry out his principal functions—the creation of the best educational facilities and the preservation of an atmosphere of free intellectual inquiry. But in these times, when the academy is staggering under the slings and arrows of outraged reactionaries, community know-nothings, and anti-intellectual Congressmen, the president of a large and well-publicized state university must play a delicate game indeed.

Dr. George D. Stoddard's abrupt dismissal from the presidency of the University of Illinois by the trustees gives the last round to the anti-intellectuals. Neither the six trustee members who voted to oust Dr. Stoddard nor Governor Stratton who approved the operation, mentioned anti-intellectualism in their vaguely worded statements to the press. Indeed, no bill of particulars has been supplied at all, apart from some scattered references to the "controversial" character of Stoddard's administration. Yet no one will deny that one reason for Dr. Stoddard's ouster is his long association with UNESCO which is regarded by a number of powerful groups in this region as a kind of educational arm of the Communist conspiracy. Nor have the Governor or Dr. Stoddard's opponents on the Board of Trustees mentioned politics in their comments. Heaven forbid! Yet everyone knows that the chief architect of the midnight firing of Stoddard and his provost Coleman Griffith was Park Livingston, a Chicago businessman who regards his presidency of the Board of Trustees as a step in the direction of higher office, preferably the United States Senate. The St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* notes that the action "climaxes a dirty political intrigue that by now must have spread a sense of shame over Illinois from Cedarville to Cairo." And the Chicago *Daily News* and the Chicago *Sun* have sharply criticized the ouster as a shabby piece of political maneuvering.

What is particularly distressing is the manner in which Dr. Stoddard was divested of office. Football-hero Red Grange played a bit part in the proceedings, and the whole unseemly procedure may go down in academic circles in sports language—from Stratton, to Livingston, to Grange. Evidently Stratton and Board president Livingston had agreed on the strategy to be employed before the Governor went off to Colorado on a vacation. Then Grange, who won national acclaim in the sporting world while at Illinois but who did not bother to finish his education there, and whose nomination to the Board was engineered in a last-minute Republican political operation in 1950, was handed the ball for a forward pass which twenty-one of twenty-two department heads in the Liberal Arts and Sciences College have described as "technically legal [but] morally unjust." Following a routine discussion of budgetary problems which lasted until midnight, Grange suddenly proposed a vote of confidence. In a matter of minutes Stoddard was out, Griffith was out and Lloyd Morey, University Comptroller, had been named acting president for a year until a successor could be chosen. Wayne Johnston, a Republican and president of the Illinois Central Railroad, and two other trustees sought vainly to stem the tide and to give the proceedings a measure of dignity.

What were the issues at stake in the Stoddard ouster apart from political intriguing, anti-intellectualism and the "get Stoddard" tactics of the local newspaper, the *News-Gazette?* Dr. Stoddard believes that the controversy over krebiozen, a drug supposed to assist in the cure of cancer, was the "trigger" which set off his forced resignation. The drug was developed by a Dr. Durovic in cooperation with Dr. Andrew Ivy, a celebrated physiologist and vice-president of the University of Illinois. When Dr. Stoddard became convinced of the uselessness of the drug after he had sifted voluminous testimony from experts in medicine and physiology, he banned further research on kreziozen at the University's medical school. The decision was taken, it must be added, only after Dr. Durovic had refused to supply samples of the drug for the kind of independent experimental work which could ultimately prove or disprove his case. Dr. Ivy subsequently took a leave of absence to carry on research on krebiozen. Since "a cure for cancer" is a matter of widespread public interest, the krebiozen affair raised a storm in the Illinois press and in the halls of the state legislature. The legislature has launched an investigation into the handling of the krebiozen case; so far the committee hearings have produced a great amount of heat and no light.

Whatever the medical merit of krebiozen may be—and at the date of this writing no real evidence has been turned up to contravene the medical profession's dubious view of the drug—it is plain that the anti-intellectuals in the legislature and on the board of trustees have been less interested in krebiozen *per se* than in making use of the controversy for purposes of political infighting and publicity.

At its midnight session the Board of Trustees also demoted Dr. Ivy from his vice-presidency, though he is retained as a full professor in the College of Medicine. It is well known, however, that Dr. Ivy has the support of a strong bloc in the legislature which would like to see him restored to his former position. If that occurs, the victory over Stoddard will be complete.

The only other charge of any substance against Dr. Stoddard is that he did not handle controversies over his personnel in the Commerce and Music schools with enough skill to prevent ugly publicity, a flurry of resignations, and a series of charges and countercharges. Certainly no supporters of Dr. Stoddard at the University would argue that the faculty has become one big happy team in the Eisenhower sense since 1946.

The University faculty, presented with a *fait accompli,* has hardly had time to react to the firing of Dr. Stoddard, let alone protest it. But already a rumble of disapproval of the trustees' action is discernible mixed with pledges of cooperation with the new president.

No doubt the University will live down the manner of Dr. Stoddard's dismissal. But anyone who believes that the incident is an isolated one, that it represents no more than a reflection given off by the controversy over krebiozen, is sadly mistaken. Senator McCarthy's treatment of President Conant of Harvard when that distinguished educator came to Washington as High Commissioner for Germany; the contempt of a considerable proportion of Illinois legislators for former President Hutchins of Chicago; the letter written to the Boston press by Senator McCarthy on the qualifications of Dr. Pusey for the presidency of Harvard—all suggest that col-

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lege presidents can no longer expect to be immune from those assaults upon intellectuals by political know-nothings which have been directed previously at professors and librarians. The faculty of the University of Illinois can help to arrest this disturbing trend if they will now turn their attention to persuading the Governor and the Board of Trustees that a "controversial" college president, endowed with firm convictions and a faith in the life of the mind, is not a liability but an asset.

Urbana, Ill. RICHARD ROBBINS
Dept. of Sociology

► East Zone Uprising

I would like to point out a contradiction in your July 20 issue, and perhaps have it cleared up. The first sentence in the article by Frank Gorrell on page six states that, "Most statesmen in all the Western European capital cities agree with top Washington officials in believing that the East German uprising and the Czechoslovak disturbances were spontaneous, serious, impressive and important." On page 12, Thomas Goldstein, in his article on the East German revolt, speaks of "the men who organized the uprising" and begins his fourth paragraph with this sentence: "When the uprisings first began, Communist propaganda was quick to claim that they were "spontaneous." He adds that, "Later, as the organized character of the action became too obvious, this claim was replaced with the crude myth. . . . " The whole article is filled with references to the organization of the revolt.

Is Mr. Gorrell perhaps mistaken in using the word "spontaneous" and are "most statesmen" mistaken also? Or does this knock the supports out from Mr. Goldstein's report?

New York City KENNETH BERNARD

The contradiction Mr. Bernard points out may only be an apparent one. I guess when Mr. Gorrell called the East Zone outbreaks "spontaneous," he meant what the dictionary calls: "Proceeding from internal impulse, without external force." The East Zone uprising was certainly that—it was not ordered or organized by an outside power—as the Communists are claiming now. It was a genuine uprising of the people in the Soviet Zone. But that does not mean that it was merely a flurry, a kind of collective burst of temper. When the Communist Berlin radio, caught off balance by the riots, in its first comments called them "spontaneous," it was obviously trying to minimize their scope, by implying that there was no organized underground resistance behind them. This Communist propaganda line (it was later abandoned) is refuted by the events themselves, as I have tried to show. A wave of industrial strikes gripping the entire zone for days, producing the same demands—partly economic, partly political—in all major cities and factories reveals a high extent of concerted action. Stone-throwing angry crowds may be acting spontaneously, in the full sense of the word. The labor uprising—which I think was by far the most serious feature of the revolt—was organized. Which is the point I was trying to bring out.

New York City THOMAS GOLDSTEIN

► "Protestant Church Under Fire"

With reference to the article, "The Protestant Church Under Fire," (*NR*, July 27) if ever there could be a bond of unity between Catholics and Protestants it should be, I think, in an effort against Senator McCarthy and his diabolical campaign which violates every law against human dignity and Christian charity, not to mention those of our governing ideals. Have we left the fundamentals of our early government to the extent that we now permit a Senator to usurp judicial powers? And to what purpose? Will all the Communists soon be exposed and then either reformed or annihilated? To any but the naïve, it seems too short a route. . . .

As an ardent and active Catholic, I am sympathetic with those priests who hate the evils in Communism so violently, but I regret that some of them seem to lose perspective in support of the wily Wisconsin Senator. Is it enough, after having unjustly insulted a man and threatened his right to prestige, a job, friends, and happiness for himself and his family when he is guiltless—is it enough to whisper in his ear that you regret the incident? What good are your regrets then, particularly when his innocence is never publicized? Is the charity we teach from the pulpit only for the books of our revered saints?

Longview, Wash. LOU STEARS

After reading the editorial that appeared some time ago, quoting in part the Philbrick article against the Protestant clergy, I was certain I was through with the *New Republic*. . . .

But now I must concede that "The Protestant Church Under Fire," by Ralph Winnett, and the second article, 'Protestants and Catholics," by William R. Bechtel, are excellent and fair studies of the whole smearing procedure against the Protestant denominations of the United States.

So I am enclosing my check for the extension of my subscription to *NR*.

Lakeview, Mich. REV. A. W. KAUFFMAN

Bandwagon

. . . This is climaxed now by the President's further mistake in making it possible to use taxpayers' money to pay for books on topics other than Communism but written by past or future traitors. . . . —*David Lawrence in* U.S. News and World Report, *July 17, 1953.*

While the long-range future of American business is perhaps better than it ever has been, Heimann [Henry H. Heimann, executive vice-president of the National Association of Credit Men] emphasizes that everyone must realize that readjustments are bound to occur from time to time. . . .

"If business did not have periods of digestion or difficulties, then business success would be inevitable even to the incompetent. Under these conditions everyone would be a businessman and few would be customers. . . . " —*From the Los Angeles* Daily News, *July 15, 1953.*

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

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